The Marital Home
Separate treatment of the marital home gives courts flexibility to use the home as an item of support for the benefit of women and children needing accommodation." 3 Whether courts can achieve these goals depends on the discretion available to them under state divorce law. Historically, two regimes have governed marital property in the United States, community property and common law, distinguished respectively by the principles of shared and individual ownership.' 4 The systems have tended to converge over time and are now united in viewing marriage as a partnership. 1 5 Despite agreement on the partnership principle, there are two different interpretations of its meaning for property awards. The resulting dichotomy does not redraw the common law/community property line, but distinguishes between equal and equitable distribution of marital assets. 6 This comment demonstrates that there are important differences in how these two systems treat the marital home. Courts in states allowing equitable distribution of marital assets are better able to give special consideration to the place of the home, while courts in states requiring equal division of assets are more likely to make awards that result in the sale of the home. The comment concludes that in any distribution system it is desirable to have a law that permits separate treatment of the home, and it identifies alternatives that may satisfy this need.
I. DESCRIPTION OF STATE MARITAL PROPERTY LAWS
Although every state's marital property regime can be said to follow either community property or common law principles, 17 the distinction may be meaningless." 8 At most it will determine which property is subject to division at divorce, not how that division is to be effected. In the eight community property states, i9 although only property acquired during marriage is subject to division, most property will be considered community property. 20 Under the traditional common law system retained by only three states, property follows title. 21 The majority of the states, however, have modified the common law title-based system so as to allow courts to apportion all the property of the divorcing parties. 2-4 (1977) ; Comment, supra note 14, at 1313 ("A myth is being perpetuated that common law principles of divorce conflict with community property principles when, in fact, the two systems have grown closer and closer together."). Common law systems are currently adopting principles of sharing from community property states, while community property systems introduce concepts of equity borrowed from common law states. See J. AREEN, supra note 16, at 636-44. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974) , has been heralded as an early sign of the breakdown between common law and community property principles. See J. AREEN, supra note 16, at 643. In that decision, the court considered the specific wording of the New Jersey equitable distribution statute and held that the legislative intent was that "all property, regardless of its source, in which a spouse acquires an interest during the marriage shall be eligible for distribution in the event of divorce. " Painter, 65 N.J. at 217, 320 A.2d at 495 (emphasis in original) .
19 Arizona, Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (1956); California, CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1970 & Supp. 1983 Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (Supp. 1982) ; Louisiana, LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (West Supp. 1983) ; Nevada, NEV. REv. STAT. § 123.220 (1979) ; New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-12 (1978) ; Texas, TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon 1975) ; and Washington, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26. 16.030 (Supp. 1983) .
20 J. AREEN, supra note 16, at 636. The California statute defines community property as "property acquired by husband and wife, or either, during marriage, when not acquired as the separate property of either." CAL. Civ. CODE § 687 (West 1982 For example a person may acquire an equitable interest in property owned by his or her spouse by making contribution to that property during the marriage. Id. See also Freed & Foster, supra note 14, at 246 (spouse may develop equity by contributions to home during marriage). In Mississippi, if a divorce is granted on grounds of irreconcilable differences, the parties must make a written agreement "for the settlement of any property rights" between them. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2 (Supp. 1982). The courts must, however, exercise discretion when the parties submit their property to the judge. At that time, the judge may incorporate the agreement into the divorce decree or may modify the decree. 
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The Marital Home tion of the common law system reflects changed ideas of economic fairness which dictate that the homemaker's nonmonetary contributions to the marriage be recognized and acknowledges that title is an inaccurate indicator of participation in the marriage." In this manner "common law" states have accepted the view of marriageas-partnership that underlies the community property systems. 2 4 The general acceptance of the partnership model has by no means given rise to uniform laws as to how marital property, once defined, 5 is to be divided. The states have adopted two different methods, equal and equitable distribution of marital property. '5 Comment, supra note 14, at 1282-84 (identifying three general methods of implementing sharing principles in common law states: (1) deferred community property, (2) equitable distribution of property, and (3) expanded alimony). The problem of identifying separate and marital property is not discussed here. For a general view of the law in this area with specific reference to the home, see Wagner, supra note 2. This issue is also implicated in awards of pensions, goodwill, and professional licenses. M. GLENDON, supra note 7, at 67-68. 24 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 483 (5th ed. 1979) defines "equitable distribution" as " [n] 524-25 (1982) . 43 Castleberry, supra note 39, at 51. The Eggemeyer decision does, however, leave room for judicial discretion in extreme cases. One aspect of this discretion is the power of the courts to consider children's needs when dividing property. Since the enactment of the Texas Code in 1841, "the property division statute has provided that the rights of children shall be considered in making the division. . Legislation in 1973 substituted "equitably" for "just and right" as the standard for property division. Id. at 412. Though Hatch was decided under the pre-1973 "just and right" standard, the courts have not recognized a change in the law--"equitably" has been construed as a variation of "just and right." Id. at 417.
47 See Comment, supra note 44, at 417, which states that "there is an established pattern of wide discretion in dividing the property, so long as the trial court begins from the premise that the division should be substantially equal, a premise which can only be overcome with sound reasons for the division." Id. But see Fong v. Fong, 121 Ariz. 298, 589 P.2d 1330 (Ct. App. 1978) (extreme need of wife not sufficient to rebut presumption of equal division).
"1 133 Ariz. 118, 649 P.2d 997 (Ct. App. 1982). 9 Id. at 121, 649 P.2d at 1000 ("The only inherent limitation on the power of the trial court to apportion community property is that the division, in the final analysis, must result in a substantially equal distribution which neither rewards nor punishes either party." (citation omitted) The value of the family home to its occupants cannot be measured solely by its value in the marketplace. The longer the occupancy, the more important these non-economic factors become and the more traumatic and disruptive a move to a new environment is to children whose roots have become firmly entwined in the school and social milieu of their neighborhood. Nevertheless, California requires equal division of the marital assets almost without exception. 0 According to the courts, equal division was "the fundamental objective of the Legislature"" 1 in adopting the Family Law Act in 1969.2 If "economic circumstances" 6 warrant, awards need not be in kind, but the court may award any asset to one party only on conditions that will lead to a substantially equal division of property."" Thus, the approach to home awards outlined in the Duke opinion seems without support in the Family Law Act. Moreover, the case law belies the Duke assumption that non-economic factors will be considered.
A California Court of Appeal's discussion in Juick v. Juick6 5 demonstrates the problems of reconciling equal division and preservation of the marital home. The trial court awarded custody of the two children along with the marital home to the wife. The wife was required to make monthly payments to the husband for his share of the equity in the house. 66 He appealed, objecting that the division of assets was not immediate and that there was no provision for the effect of inflation on the value of the wife's payments to him. 67 The court of appeal held that he had no right to the immediate enjoyment of an asset, but found that deferred enjoyment 927, 927, 134 Cal. Rptr. 161, 162 (1976) (home awarded to wife on execution of promissory note; remanded as unequal since note's face value failed to take account of uncertainty, inflation, and concerns of ownership). The parties had been married 10 years and the children were aged seven and nine. In addition to making payments to her husband for his share of the equity in the house, the wife assumed a $10,407 encumbrance on the house. A lien on the property secured the payments to the husband. Id. 67 Id. at 424, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 326-27.
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was relevant in assessing the equality of the division., As to the effects of inflation, the court held that "when monies to be acquired by one's spouse in the future are injected as an element, there is no reason why the effort should not be made to reach mathematical equality." ' 9 Applying this rather strict and literal test of equal division, the court remanded the case for further findings and, if necessary, a modification of the installment arrangement.
7 0
The debilitating effect of this strict equality requirement on efforts to award the marital home to the party with custody of minor children becomes more apparent in cases decided after Juick. In Holmgren v. Holmgren" 1 upon the breakup of a twenty-oneyear marriage, the wife received custody of the minor child. 2 The wife claimed that the home was her only "real security 1 7 3 and that its sale would be unreasonable under the circumstances, but the court applied the equal division standard. Since the wife was financially unable to purchase the husband's share of the house, the house was sold and the proceeds divided. 7 4 In Gonzales v. Gonzales, 7 5 the trial court had awarded the use and possession of the marital home to the wife, but left title to the property in the husband and wife as tenants in common.
7 6 The California Court of Appeal determined that the trial court awarded the home to the wife "because economically, based on its then determination of the respective property interests, and environmentally, it felt it was best for her and the children. ' 7 7 Nevertheless, the arrangement was remanded for modification in compliance with the equality standard. 8 After Holmgren and Gonzales, only those arrangements that are arithmetically equal appear to be able to withstand a court's scrutiny on appeal. Since the home is often the couple's largest asset, it can seldom be balanced off by other awards when equal division is mandated. Thus the requirements of equal division inhibit outright awards of the marital home to either party, even if judges recognize a need to preserve the home.
2. Equal Division in Other States. Through statute and judicial interpretation, other states have adopted equal division standards similar to California's. 7 9 These laws, too, may pose obstacles to treating the marital home differently from other marital property. For example, the Idaho statute allows deviation from equal division only for "compelling reasons." 8 0 Judicial construction of the law, citing California precedent, places the burden of persuading the trial court to award other than a fifty-fifty distribution on the party asserting the need for inequality."' This burden is disproportionately strong because the spouse requiring additional support may have fewer resources with which to combat an unfavorable presumption.
The effect of a strong presumption of absolute equality is apparent in Wisconsin case law. In Drews v. Drews, 82 for example, because there was "no clear case for a property share in excess of 50%," the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected the trial court's decision to award sixty percent of the marital property to the wife and forty percent to the husband. 8 3 Yet the wife had custody of the couple's child and a full-time salary considerably less than half of her husband's. 84 In another Wisconsin case, the court imposed a fifty-fifty split of the marital assets despite the fact that the effect of the division was to force a sale of the marital home. 8 has had on the disposition of the marital home after divorce. Forty-six percent of those surveyed owned or had some equity in a home, as compared to an eleven percent ownership rate for other real estate and businesses. 87 Additionally, families with minor children were found more likely to own homes than were childless couples; only thirty-three percent of couples without children were homeowners, while sixty-five percent of families with young children owned a home." 8 Data on home awards in California were compiled before and after the adoption of the Family Law Act and the equal division requirement." The study indicates that with the implementation of no-fault divorce and the equal division standard in 1969,90 more homes were divided equally: from one-fourth of the homes in 1968 to one-third in 1977.91 There was a corresponding decline in the percentage of cases in which the greater part of the home equity was awarded to the wife;' the presence of minor children did not increase the likelihood that the wife would be awarded the marital home. 9 s The number of cases in which there was an explicit order to sell the home rose from about one in ten in 1968 to about one in three in 1977." By 1977, in most cases in which the home was a marital asset subject to division, it was sold rather than awarded intact.' The study concludes that concern over "the effects of a forced sale of the home on the children appears to be well-founded since our data reveal that 66% of the couples who were forced to sell their homes had minor children. 
B. Equitable Division and the Marital Home
Equitable division regimes are characterized by flexible statutory guidelines, which can accommodate special consideration of the home. 97 In equitable division states, awards of the home's use or possession have been based on the need to "retain the stability of the family home for the [custodial spouse] and minor children,""" "the financial and emotional needs of the children," s 9 the need for shelter, 1 00 "'the adverse effect a change in surroundings often has on children of tender years,' -'o' the cost of arranging for sale depleting resources available for support, 1 2 and simply the best interests of the children involved.' 03 When an award of the home or its use has not been made, the reasons given are usually economic-that there was too little property of the marriage to enable equitable distribution at all.' 04 The law of Connecticut exemplifies the flexibility of an equitable division regime. Connecticut adopted no-fault divorce in 1973 while retaining the theory that property held during the marriage agreed that equal division was basically fair, close to 40% thought that judges should be allowed more discretion in dividing community property, specifically the marital home. Id. at 1200. Attorneys who concluded that there was enough discretion in the system pointed to the role of judges in assigning value to community property and setting support awards. Id. 
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The Marital Home belongs to the spouse who holds title. 105 At the time of dissolution, however, judges may modify the separate property principle based on consideration of equitable factors, including the length of the marriage, the parties' ages, health, and station, their occupations, the amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, the size of the estate, the liabilities and needs of each party, the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income, and the contribution of the parties in the acquisition, preservation, or appreciation in value of their respective estates. 1 1 0 A 1976 survey of divorces in Connecticut, 10 7 when compared with the California study,°1 0 illustrates how differently equal and equitable division schemes affect the disposition of the marital home. The Connecticut study revealed that when houses were jointly held by the divorcing parties (about sixty-eight percent of the cases), the court ordered sale and division in about sixteen percent of the cases, 10 9 less than half the rate recorded in California for 1977.110 The Connecticut study also found that fifteen percent of the women who were awarded the family home were forced to sell it to meet financial obligations. 1 1 Comparable data for California indicate that almost two-thirds of the children involved in a divorce had changed their place of residence within three years of the divorce. 112 If half of this group represents divorces where the home was ordered sold,s a substantial proportion of the remainder must represent families that moved because financial pressures to uphold the award of the marital home to the custodial spouse. The court noted that the child of the divorcing couple "might be further disturbed if forced to move away from the home, neighborhood school, and friends," 3 5 and concluded that this division of the property was "within the ambit of the court's discretion" where the court based its order on "the need for the custodial parent to retain the family home" and "the economic circumstances of the parties."
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As an alternative to awarding the marital home to the custodial spouse, the UMDA also suggests granting the custodial spouse the right to live in the home for a reasonable period.
137 Some courts have achieved this by relying on a trust for sale, leaving the property in possession of the custodial spouse to benefit the children. 38 Typically, sale of the house depends on some future event (such as the children's majority) at which time the proceeds will be divided between the spouses. 134 See COLo. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1973 14-10-113 ( & Supp. 1982 determining the disposition of the marital home. 145 As one English court explained, whenever a court is dealing with families of limited resources, "needs" are likely to be much more important than resources, when it comes to exercising discretion. In most individuals and most families the most urgent need is a home. It is therefore to the provision of homes for all concerned that the courts should direct their attention in the first place. 146 The emphasis on needs has also led many courts to reject the notion of a "clean break, "147 or final financial settlement upon divorce. For example, in Moore v. Moore, 148 the court held that the clean break principle should not be adopted in cases in which a continuing link between the parties exists through children or in situations in which one of the parties would have to obtain support from the state. 49 The English courts have stressed the importance of the home to adequate child support to the extent that "it is now a common feature of dissolution proceedings for the property rights eventually to be adjusted so as to give priority to the accommodation of the spouse who is looking after the children."1 8 0 The courts have implemented this goal with the device of a trust for sale. Both parties retain beneficial ownership in the home, but the custodial spouse has possession during their children's minority. 5 one of the first cases to order such an arrangement. In Mesher itself, the wife had remained with the couple's child in the marital home. To avoid depriving the husband of his property interest but at the same time to provide housing for the wife and child, the court imposed a trust for sale. 154 Similarly, in Harvey v. Harvey 55 the court reconciled the competing property rights of the spouses with the children's need for a home by means of a Mesher order. The court justified its order by referring to the parties' initial intent when they invested in the home:
[T]his asset would never have been available to either of the parties as a capital or income producing asset as such, whilst they both survived and whilst their marriage subsisted .... They would not have had the asset to realize during the currency of their marriage unless they had both agreed to obtain less expensive accommodation after their family had grown up and left them. 5 "
The court concluded that the sale should be postponed for the wife's lifetime, with an occupation rent to be paid to the husband after the children's emancipation.
1 5 7
The English courts and Parliament are still developing techniques to resolve the tension between the needs approach and property rights, 1 58 but the British recognition of the special nature of the marital home among marital properties seems well established. 1 59 According to Lord Denning, note 138, at 407-14. Two other types of orders are frequently directed at the marital home upon divorce. One is a charge order, which resembles a trust for sale with the exception that it does not reflect a real interest in the property. The nonresident spouse has merely a security interest in the home. The second type of arrangement is a settlement order, which settles the property upon the custodial spouse and a future interest upon the noncustodial party. A trust for sale may also be imposed as part of a settlement order, but a settlement need not rest on beneficial co-ownership of the property. 
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[w]hen judges are dealing with the matrimonial home, they nowadays have great regard to the fact that the house is bought as a home in which the family is to be brought up. It is not treated as property to be sold, nor as an investment to be realised for cash. 6 0
The widespread view that the home should be awarded based upon the children's needs is further reinforced by a recent Law Commission report recommending that the needs of children be established as a priority in financial orders upon divorce. 6 '
C. Maryland
In 1978, Maryland adopted a domestic relations law that clearly established a separate legal regime for the marital home. 62 Under the law, Maryland courts are disabled from changing title to property 6 but may achieve an equitable distribution of property acquired during the marriage by providing a monetary award to reflect an equal division of the value of the marital property.'" The act, however, separates the marital home and "family use perfor the marital home. Glendon describes this as part of a similar shift within most family property systems. Swedish law, for example, permits an award of the house to the one who needs it most, usually the custodial parent. In France, a home held as separate property by one spouse may be subjected to a lease in favor of the other if the latter retains custody of the children. M. GLENDON, supra note 7, at 81 n.114.
The trust for sale may persist for some time in England, as a bill that would have provided a statutory basis for co-ownership of the marital home died in Parliament in February 1980. Temkin, Property Relations During Marriage in England and Ontario, 30 INT'Lsonal property" 1 ' 5 from other marital assets and gives the courts discretion to grant a use and possession award of the former assets for up to three years to the custodial spouse."" 6 In exercising this discretion, courts must consider the best interests of any minor children and the spouses' interests in the home as a dwelling place and as an investment.
6 7
A recent decision by the Maryland Court of Appeals 168 lists the benefits intended by the Maryland statute. The court affirmed the trial court's order of use and possession to the custodial spouse during the period after the filing for divorce and prior to the final divorce decree. The court rejected a due process challenge to the statute in part because of the state's interest in child welfare, relying on the legislature's stated goal in enacting the section to give "particular and favorable attention" 16 to the needs of children. 170 The court found that "[tihe procedure provided for in [the statute] seeks to avoid uprooting the children from the home, school, social and community setting upon which they are dependent, especially during the period of parental separation. Even so, the statute falls short of a solution to the problem of accommodating the children's needs upon divorce because the judicial discretion to recognize those needs is limited to a three-year award and restricted to a "use and possession" arrangement.
'" "Family use personal property" is defined as "tangible personal property, acquired during the marriage, owned by either spouse or owned jointly by both spouses, and used primarily for family purposes." Id. § 3-6A-01(c). Maryland courts also have power to determine possession of the property regardless of title, id. § 3-6A-06(c)(1), and to make orders for payment of mortgage, maintenance, insurance, taxes, and other expenses connected with the property, id. § 3-6A-06(c)(2). I-Id. § 3-6A-06. 147 Id. § 3-6A-06(a) directs courts to determine occupancy of the home with reference to the following factors:
(1) The best interests of any minor child;
(2) The respective interest of each spouse in continuing to use the family use personal property or occupy or use the family home or any portion of it as a dwelling place;
(3) The respective interest of each spouse in continuing to use the family use personal property or occupy or use the family home or any part of it for the production of income; (4) Any hardship imposed upon the spouse whose interest in the family home or family use personal property is infringed upon by an order issued under this section. The statute's preamble states that "if there are minor children in the family, their interest must be given particular and favorable attention." Id. 
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